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ABSTRACT 
 
A growing body of literature examines whether corporate clients derive sufficient value 
from the law firms that they engage.  Yet little attention has been paid to whether clients 
optimally select among law firms in the first place.  One entry-point is to identify 
discrepancies in the quality of counsel selected by different corporate clients for the very same 
work.  Using a large sample of loans, this Article finds that major U.S. public companies 
select lower-ranked law firms for their financing transactions than do private equity-owned 
companies, controlling for various deal characteristics.  While some of this discrepancy can be 
attributed to value-maximizing behavior, agency and other information problems within 
public companies may distort their choice of counsel.  Contrary to the thrust of existing 
commentary, U.S. public companies may well be spending too little on outside counsel.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate clients select their law firms for myriad reasons, some of which 
are likely to be value-maximizing, and some of which are not.  The economic 
stakes are high: to the extent that clients fail to make first-best decisions in 
hiring counsel, they may derive needlessly poor outcomes from the legal 
services that they purchase, while law firms earn large rents at their clients’ 
expense.  Yet because we lack straightforward measures of the quality of law 
firms’ output, we are generally left either to assume that clients choose their 
counsel rationally or to suspect that they do not, depending solely on our 
priors about the efficiency of markets.   
This Article takes an indirect tack in broaching the problem.  It begins with 
a more readily observable inquiry—whether different types of corporate clients 
select different quality counsel for the very same work.  If so, we have 
evidence that, at the very least, law-firm selection is non-random.  Further, we 
will be left with a far simpler task than assessing the efficiency of law firm 
selection in general.  The set of plausible factors driving a discrepancy in 
choice of counsel between different types of clients is likely to be 
comparatively small.  Once identified, these factors can be classified according 
to whether they are likely to be value-maximizing for the client, providing 
narrower testable hypotheses for future work. 
This Article focuses on two types of clients having very different goals and 
governance, but with the financial means to select among a wide range of law 
firms: 1) large private equity firms and 2) major public companies.1  Given 
their prominence in large financings and acquisitions, private equity firms have 
increasingly captured the time and attention of elite law firms in the United 
States and abroad.  Private equity firms tend to be leanly staffed2 and thus to 
rely heavily on outside counsel.  Large public companies, by contrast, may 
have large teams of in-house lawyers and are therefore less reliant on outside 
counsel for certain types of work.3  These and other differences between the 
                                                 
1 “Private equity” as used herein refers only to investment funds whose focus is leveraged, 
majority-stake investments in mature businesses—that is, leveraged buyout funds.  Thus, for 
example, venture capital is not treated here as private equity.   
2 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, 
at 70. 
3 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
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two may manifest in different preferences for the quality of outside counsel 
that they select. 
Various theories have been advanced for the value added by lawyers in 
corporate transactions.  Gilson (1984) describes transactional lawyers as 
“transaction-cost engineers” who, even in the absence of regulation, can increase 
the transaction value by structuring the transaction and crafting contract terms 
so as to minimize the parties’ aggregate transaction costs (including in 
particular their information costs).4  Kraakman and others suggest that law 
firms act as reputational intermediaries in corporate transactions: their reputation 
plays a certification role that allows parties to reach an agreement at lower 
cost.5  Still others argue that transactional lawyers primarily serve as regulatory 
experts.6  When the focus narrows to law firms with high-market-share 
transactional practices, their knowledge of the current “market” terms for a 
particular type of transaction can also create value.7  As market information 
experts, they should be able to negotiate transaction terms that yield more 
transaction surplus for their clients.8 
Using a large sample of syndicated loan transactions, I find that private 
equity-owned companies are substantially more likely to engage top-ranked 
borrower’s counsel than are their public-company counterparts, controlling for 
various loan characteristics.  Why might private equity sponsors be more 
willing to pay for elite law firms than much larger organizations such as 
Fortune 500 companies, for the very same types of transactions?  Conversely, 
what explains the relative reticence of major corporations to engage top-tier 
                                                                                                                            
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277–80 (1985) (describing the increasing importance of in-house counsel in 
large corporations). 
4 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239 (1984). 
5 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 61 n.20 (1986); Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 
OR. L. REV. 15, 18–19 (1995); Gilson, supra note 4, at 290–93; Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, 
Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1739–40 (1998).  For empirical work 
testing the gatekeeper hypothesis, see Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel as 
Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. 
MKTS. L.J. 164, 165 (2007) (finding that higher-quality law firms preserve some independence 
relative to the issuer in IPOs); Michael Bradley et al., Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt 
Market?, 38 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 150, 162 (2014) (finding no evidence in the sovereign debt 
markets that law firms act as reputational intermediaries). 
6 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 239 (2010); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500 
(2007). 
7 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 41 J. 
Corp. L. 101 (forthcoming 2016).  See also Christel Karsten, Ulrike Malmendier & Zacharias 
Sautner, M&A Negotiations and Lawyer Expertise (Mar. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576866 (finding that more experienced M&A lawyers obtain 
better contract terms for their clients).  
8 Id. 
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law firms?   
In considering these questions, we first observe that private equity firms 
are relatively well incentivized to select counsel for their portfolio companies 
that maximizes their expected value from the transaction.  Private equity 
investments are typically highly leveraged,9 meaning that any improvement in 
transaction terms that counsel can obtain results in a relatively larger economic 
return.  Further, private equity sponsors benefit more directly from such 
increased returns than do the public-company agents—typically, general 
counsels—responsible for selecting outside counsel.  Private equity sponsors 
commonly receive twenty percent of the profits from their portfolio-company 
transactions (the “carry”),10 which is then shared among a relatively small 
number of individuals.  Such high-powered incentives to maximize transaction 
value contrast with the relatively low-powered incentives faced by public-
company general counsels.11     
Not only are private equity firms better incentivized to select counsel 
optimally, they are arguably better able to do so.  As sophisticated, repeat 
players with respect to leveraged acquisitions,12 they can benchmark their 
outside counsel’s performance across a sizable volume of transactions.  Thus, 
overall, private equity firms internalize both the costs (higher legal fees) and 
the benefits (the expectation of a better economic deal) of hiring top-tier law 
firms relatively well.  From the outset, then, their revealed preference for elite 
counsel suggests that it is likely to be value-maximizing.   
The picture for public companies is murkier.  Major public companies face 
a classic “make-or-buy” decision when it comes to transactional work: they can 
engage a law firm or rely on in-house counsel.13  Yet framing the make-or-buy 
decision as a binary choice is misleading in this context.  In practice, the 
difficulty lies in selecting from a wide range in quality of outside counsel, once 
the decision to “buy” has been made.  This Article’s empirical result raises the 
possibility that public companies are selecting an inefficiently low quality of 
legal work for their transactions.  Stated differently, a general counsel’s bias 
toward “making” legal work in-house may manifest as a tendency not only to 
forgo (or under-utilize) outside counsel for certain work, but also to select 
lower-quality outside counsel than is optimal for the company. 
                                                 
9 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 121, 124 (2009).  
10 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
11 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRM, 
MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (describing the high-powered incentives 
provided by market transactions versus the low-powered incentives within firms). 
12 See, e.g., Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 115 (2013). 
13 See Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. 
CORP. L. 497 (2008). 
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To be sure, in-house counsel at public companies can help monitor outside 
law firms’ work,14 thus potentially increasing the value that outside counsel 
provides once a law firm has been engaged.  Yet there are reasons to doubt whether 
public-company general counsels optimally select among law firms in the first 
instance.  Particularly for one-off transactions, general counsels may not be 
correctly incentivized to make value-maximizing choices.  Information, agency, 
and influence costs within public companies may drive general counsels to 
steer transactional work to cheaper firms or to in-house counsel, even when 
doing so is not in shareholders’ best interests.15  This raises the surprising 
possibility that, contrary to the prevailing view, major U.S. public companies 
may in fact be under-spending on legal services.16 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the data and regression 
model and presents the finding of a substantial discrepancy in the quality of 
counsel selected by private equity-owned companies and public companies.  
Part II discusses plausible explanations for the differential.  Finally, Part III 
assesses these explanations in practice, through a case study of four multi-
billion-dollar loan transactions for which the public-company borrowers chose 
law firms outside the circle of elite borrower’s counsel. 
 
 
I.  LAW FIRM SELECTION IN PRACTICE: PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS VS. 
PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 
This Part provides evidence that private equity sponsors are more likely to 
engage top-tier law firms to negotiate their syndicated-loan financings (or 
“bank debt”)17 than are public companies. 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and 
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 487 (1989) 
15 See infra Part II.B.C. 
16 Contra Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the 
Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (identifying excessive fees as one of 
the threats to the future of major corporate law firms). 
17 Syndicated loans are typically senior secured commercial loans that are arranged by a 
major investment or commercial bank and funded by a large group of bank and non-bank 
lenders.  See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan 
Markets, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 21, 23–24 (Allison 
Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: 
Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 982 
(2009).  Relative to other major corporate transactions, syndicated loans are lightly regulated in 
the United States and otherwise raise little risk of litigation.  Most notably, syndicated loans are 
not treated as securities, notwithstanding that they may be held and traded by large numbers of 
investors. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan 
Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 747 (2014); Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots, 
32 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (2015). To be sure, a syndicated loan transaction may involve litigation 
risk if it occurs in connection with another high-stakes transaction, such as an acquisition. 
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A.  Description of Data 
 
The initial sample consists of 4,201 credit agreements for U.S. syndicated 
loans issued between July 2011 and May 2016, from the Practical Law 
database.18  This database is limited to credit agreements that were publicly 
filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  Relative to the 
complete universe of syndicated loans, therefore, larger loans are likely 
overrepresented in our sample, while loans involving private companies 
(including, notably, loans to private-equity-owned companies) are 
underrepresented.19  After excluding loans totaling less than $50 million in 
principal amount and loans used for debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, we 
are left with a sample of 4,164 credit agreements.     
For each loan, the primary characteristics of interest are 1) whether the 
borrower was sponsored by a private-equity firm and 2) the quality of the 
borrower’s law firm (if any).  Because law-firm quality is not directly 
observable, two categories of metrics are constructed here as proxies: rankings 
based on market share (designed to capture law firms’ experience with the 
applicable type of transaction) and rankings based on reputation among 
market participants.  In the first category, we derive each law firm’s share of 
borrower-side legal representation for syndicated loan deals (or leveraged 
syndicated loan deals, depending on the regression sample used), where market 
share is based here on aggregate dollar-amount of loans.  The loan amounts 
for each law firm are obtained from Bloomberg and independently calculated 
within our sample of Practical Law credit agreements, creating two separate 
market-share metrics.20 
Unlike what we observe with law-firm league tables for mergers and 
acquisitions, the set of top borrower-side law firms by market share for 
syndicated loans (and leveraged syndicated loans) is somewhat variable from 
year to year.  Given that, we instead rank firms in each year based on a 
calculation of their aggregate market share of borrower-side representation 
                                                 
18 What’s Market—Credit Agreements: Comprehensive Deal Database, PRAC. L., 
http://us.practicallaw.com/resources/us-whats-market. 
19 This sample bias should not be problematic for our analysis, however.  First, we 
explicitly restrict the sample to large loans (greater than $50 million in principal amount) in any 
event, in order to ensure that all borrowers in the sample have the ability to pay for a wide 
range in quality of counsel.  Second, relying solely on publicly-filed credit agreements implies 
that, to the extent the borrower is private-equity-sponsored, that private equity firm is likely to 
be larger than average. (For example, many such credit agreements likely involve going-private 
transactions.)  The empirical tests control for loan size, however, which should achieve some 
measure of normalization between the private equity firms and the public companies in the 
sample. 
20 The Bloomberg data is based on self-reporting by law firms, and covers all syndicated 
loans (or leveraged syndicated loans), rather than just loans publicly filed with the SEC. 
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over the previous several years.21  Finally, a firm is coded as top-ranked in a 
given year if it fell within the top 10, 15, or 20 law firms for that year. 
Our reputation-based measure of the quality of counsel is based on the 
Chambers and Partners rankings of U.S. law firms.  We code a borrower’s law 
firm as top-ranked in any given year if it was included within any tier of the 
Chambers “Banking & Finance: Nationwide” rankings for the prior year.22  The 
Chambers rankings cover a total of 21 law firms in each year.23  
Setting the cut-off for elite-quality law firms at approximately the top 20 
(or fewer) is justified by the fact that borrower-side representation is highly 
concentrated in the syndicated loan market.  Figure 1 depicts law firms’ prior-
four-year market share of borrower-side leveraged-loan representation, in 
ranked order for 2016. While the first few firms each hold a significant share 
of the market, market share falls off rapidly thereafter.  The top twenty firms 
represent almost 60% of the market in aggregate.24 
 
Figure 1.  Top Law Firms’ Market Share of Borrower-Side Representation 
for Leveraged Loans (2016). 
                                                 
21 The ranking based on Bloomberg data looks back to the prior four years of loan 
volume, while the ranking using the Practical Law sample looks back only two years, because 
the Practical Law database only begins in 2011.  (The regressions using the latter metric are 
therefore limited to credit agreements from 2013-2016, rather than from 2011-2016, in order 
to construct the two-year look-back for market share.)  Because loan volume was exceptionally 
low in 2008 and 2009, we exclude those years in all calculations, instead looking back to the 
immediately preceding years where applicable.  
22 The current ranking is available at 
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12788/6/editorial/5/1 (last visited on June 28, 2016).  
Unfortunately, the “Banking and Finance: Nationwide” category extends beyond syndicated 
loans, and does not distinguish between borrower-side and lender-side work.  
23 In the event that the borrower was represented by more than one law firm for the same 
loan (as where local-counsel opinions were sought regarding collateral, for example), the 
borrower is coded as having been represented by a top-ranked law firm if any of the 
borrower’s law firms was top-ranked for that year.  The borrower’s law firm was not reported 
for 1,104 of the 4,164 loans in the sample.  In each such instance, the borrower’s law firm is 
coded as though it were not top-ranked, on the theory that it was not disclosed either because 
the law firm was relatively unknown or because the borrower relied solely on in-house counsel 
to negotiate the loan terms.  As a robustness check, all observations for which the borrower’s 
law firm was not reported were excluded from the sample in unreported regressions, which 
yielded similar results to those reported here. 
24 In unreported regressions, similar results were obtained using top 10 and top 15 
rankings as cutoffs. 
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Table 1 below presents summary statistics for the 2,982 leveraged loans in 
the sample, which are used in the reported regressions.  On average, private 
equity-backed loans in the sample are larger than non-sponsored loans and are 
more likely to have been (i) negotiated by a top-ranked law firm, (ii) secured, 
and (iii) incurred in connection with an acquisition. 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics. 
Borrower 
Sponsored by 
Private 
Equity Firm? 
Number 
of Loans 
Average 
Loan Size 
(in USD) 
Represented by 
Top 20-Ranked 
Law Firm (%)25
Secured 
Loan (%) 
Acquisition-
Related 
Loan (%) 
Sponsored 429 
(14.4%) 
$718 million 
 
59.0% 
 
95.1% 26.6% 
Not sponsored 
 
2,553 
(85.6%) 
$547 million 23.1% 72.0% 14.6% 
Full sample 
 
2,982 
(100%) 
$572 million 28.3% 75.2% 16.3% 
                                                 
25 Figures reported here using rankings for the metric based on Bloomberg-reported loan 
volumes. 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
0 20 40 60 80 100
%	
Ma
rke
t	S
ha
re	
By
	Do
lla
r‐V
alu
e	o
f	L
oa
ns	
(Pr
ior
	4	Y
ear
s)
2016	Law	Firm	Ranking
 AGENCY COSTS IN LAW FIRM SELECTION 9 
 
 
B.  Model and Results 
 
A logit regression model is used here to test whether private-equity-owned 
borrowers are more likely than public companies to select top-ranked counsel 
for their syndicated loan transactions.  The specification is as follows: 
 
݈݋݃݅ݐሺܶ݋݌_ܨ݅ݎ݉ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܵ݌݋݊ݏ݋ݎ݁݀ ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ܺଶ ൅⋯൅ ߚே ൈ ܺே ൅ ߝ 
 
where each loan transactions is a separate observation, the logit function is the 
natural logarithm of the odds ratio that the borrower will select top-ranked 
finance counsel for that loan, α and β1 through βN are the scalar constant and 
coefficients, respectively, to be estimated by the regression, Sponsored is an 
indicator variable identifying whether the borrower is private equity-
sponsored, and X2 through XN are control variables capturing loan 
characteristics that might affect the desirability of elite-quality counsel.   
Specifically, the regression controls first for loan size, as we would expect 
larger loans to be associated with higher-quality counsel, all else equal.  
Acquisition-related loans might also call for higher-quality counsel, because the 
acquisition itself may involve significant regulatory and litigation risk, and 
contingencies associated with the acquisition increase the complexity of the 
loan transaction.26  Syndicated loans that are secured are also relatively more 
complex, thus potentially increasing the value to the borrower of more elite 
counsel.  In addition, loans to borrowers in certain industries may present 
uniquely complex regulatory issues, thereby affecting choice of counsel.27 
Finally, the debt markets recognize a significant divide between 
investment-grade debt and below-investment grade (“high-yield” or 
                                                 
26 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS 
OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015) (finding that 93 percent 
of all mergers and acquisitions transactions with targets valued over $100 million resulted in 
litigation).  
27 Under an adversarial model of transaction bargaining, one might also wish to control 
for the quality of the agent’s counsel.  The regressions reported herein do not do so, however, 
because there were too few observations for which the agent’s counsel was reported.  Further, 
in the syndicated-loan market, it is not uncommon for the agent’s counsel to be selected only 
after the borrower’s counsel has been selected, and, in many cases, subject to the borrower’s 
approval.  (Private equity firms in particular have been able to narrow the agent’s choice to 
“designated lender counsel” that is hand-picked by the private equity firm.)  Most importantly, 
financing transactions should not be thought of as adversarial, zero-sum, negotiations.  In 
most cases, it is in the parties’ interests to maximize their joint aggregate surplus from the 
transaction (such as by devising terms that lower the parties’ collective transaction costs), prior 
to negotiating how that surplus should be split.  See de Fontenay, supra note 7.  Given that, the 
relationship between the quality of borrower’s counsel and the quality of lender’s counsel need 
not be linear.   
10 AGENCY COSTS IN LAW FIRM SELECTION  
“leveraged”) debt in terms of risk, documentation, and creditors.28  
Investment-grade loans commonly involve blue-chip borrowers and relatively 
simple credit agreements with few covenants and other restrictions affecting 
the borrower.  Leveraged loans, by contrast, involve borrowers with a high 
proportion of debt in their capital structure (either by choice or as a result of 
financial distress), and are thus associated with complex credit agreements and 
highly restrictive covenants.   
The predicted effect of investment-grade status on the borrower’s choice 
of counsel is unclear, however.  The simpler investment-grade deals might 
entail less incremental value to engaging higher-quality counsel, but 
investment-grade issuers may have a greater ability to pay for high-quality 
counsel on average.  To address this distinction in the two types of syndicated 
loans, the regressions reported here are limited to leveraged loans (loans rated 
below investment-grade by the credit rating agencies), for a final sample size of 
2,982 agreements.  (Unreported regressions use the full sample of loans, but 
control for whether a loan is rated investment-grade.)  
Table 2 presents the regression results for the leveraged-loan sample, with 
the three reported models differing only in the metric used to rank the law 
firms.  First, there is a large, positive, and statistically significant association 
between the borrower’s status as a private equity-sponsored company and the 
likelihood that the borrower will select elite-quality counsel.  This result is 
robust to the use of the three different measures of law-firm quality.  The odds 
that a borrower will be represented by a top-ranked law firm are approximately 
three to four times higher (depending on the ranking metric) if the borrower is 
private-equity-sponsored than if it is a public company.  Second, among the 
control variables, the size of the loan and whether it is secured both 
significantly increase a borrower’s likelihood of selecting elite counsel, while 
there was no statistically significant effect for whether the loan was issued in 
connection with an acquisition, or, in unreported regressions using the full 
sample, for whether the loan was investment-grade.  Appendix A reports the 
results of the same regressions, with the addition of industry control 
variables.29 
 
  
                                                 
28 See STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 7, 13, 23 (2012), available at 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf. 
29 Regression models with fixed effects for the year in which the loan was issued did not 
generally produce statistically significant results for the year indicators and are omitted here. 
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Table 2.  Logistic Regression Results: Effect of Private Equity-Ownership 
on Borrower’s Odds of Selecting Elite Counsel. 
 
 Top-Firm_1 Top-Firm_2 Top-Firm_3 
Sponsored 4.184 2.925 3.747 
 (12.51)** (7.79)** (11.47)** 
ln(Loan Amount) 1.557 1.537 1.706 
 (10.59)** (8.75)** (12.42)** 
Acquisition Purpose 1.066 1.041 1.000 
 (0.56) (0.30) (0.00) 
Secured Loan 1.882 1.536 1.711 
 (5.61)** (3.38)** (4.75)** 
  
N 2,982 1,971 2,982 
 
* Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
 
Note: The reported logistic regression coefficients are odds ratios.  Z statistics are in 
parentheses.   
 
Table 3.  Variable Definitions. 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
Dependent Variable: 
 
    Top-Firm_1 Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was among the top 20 
borrower-side law firms for the year in which the loan was 
issued, ranked according to aggregate market share of 
borrower-side representation for leveraged loans over the 
previous four years (excepting 2008-2009), using leveraged loan 
volumes by law firm reported by Bloomberg.  The sample 
period for this model is 2011-2016. 
 
    Top-Firm_2 Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was among the top 20 
borrower-side law firms for the year in which the loan was 
issued, ranked according to aggregate market share of 
borrower-side representation for leveraged loans over the 
previous two years, using leveraged loan volumes by law firm 
from within the sample (Practical Law).  The sample period for 
this model is 2013-2016. 
 
    Top-Firm_3 Equal to 1 if the borrower’s law firm was listed in any tier of 
the Chambers and Partners “Banking & Finance: Nationwide” 
rankings in the prior year.  The sample period for this model is 
2011-2016. 
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Independent Variables: 
 
   Sponsored Equal to 1 if the borrower was private equity-owned when the 
loan transaction closed. 
 
   Ln(Loan Amount) Natural logarithm of the principal amount of the loan facility in 
U.S. dollars. 
 
   Acquisition Purpose Equal to 1 if the loan was issued at least in part to finance an 
acquisition. 
 
   Secured Loan Equal to 1 if any part of the loan was secured by the borrower’s 
assets. 
 
 
II.  INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
 
Controlling for loan characteristics, then, public companies appear to 
select lower-ranked counsel for their bank-debt financings than do private-
equity-owned companies.30  Before proceeding, however, a clarification is in 
order as to who selects outside counsel for each group.  The regression sample 
consists of large U.S. syndicated loans by private-equity-sponsored companies 
and (non-sponsored) public companies.  Thus, in the former case, the 
regression estimates the quality of financing counsel engaged by private equity-
owned companies (the “portfolio companies”), rather than by the private 
equity sponsors (the investment professionals) or the private equity funds (the 
investment vehicles) themselves.  The goal is to obtain a sample of 
organizations (in this case, large operating companies) of comparable size and 
other characteristics.  Yet for large financing transactions such as those 
covered by the sample, borrower’s counsel is, in practice, selected by the 
private equity sponsor, rather than by the portfolio company itself, even 
though the latter bears the debt.31  In the case of public companies, borrower’s 
counsel is typically selected by the company’s general counsel (if any),32 subject 
in some cases to management-imposed restrictions discussed in Part II.B.  As 
we will see, this difference in decision-making agency between the two groups 
may explain much of the discrepancy in the quality of counsel that they select.    
                                                 
30 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that private equity sponsors hire top-tier law firms 
when acquiring companies, while the target companies (often public companies) do so less 
often.  See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 534–38 
(2009). 
31 See id. 
32 See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (1985); Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 960, 971 (2005). 
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A.  The Private Equity Perspective 
 
Returning to the regression results, what factors explain the two groups’ 
differing choices of counsel, and what, if anything, can be said about whether 
these choices are value-maximizing?  Somewhat surprisingly, the latter 
question is the easier to address, and we begin there.  Even before identifying 
what drives their choice of counsel, we have good reasons to believe that 
private equity firms act relatively efficiently in favoring elite counsel for their 
financing transactions.   
First, the stakes are generally higher for private equity firms than for public 
companies.  Private equity-owned companies are, on average, significantly 
more leveraged than their public-company counterparts.33 Any marginal 
increase in transaction value that an elite law firm can provide represents, on 
average, a greater overall economic advantage for a private equity-owned 
company than it would for a comparably-sized public company.  Simply put, 
private equity-owned companies will, on average, get more bang for their buck 
from an improvement in financing terms than would a comparable public 
company. 
Second, we should expect private equity firms to internalize the costs and 
benefits of their portfolio companies’ legal representation relatively well, 
meaning that the economic effects of choice of counsel flow through to the 
party that ultimately makes that choice.  Indeed, as the sole or majority 
shareholder of its portfolio companies, a private equity fund’s interests are 
largely aligned with those of its portfolio companies.34  Moving up the ladder, 
the typical compensation structure—which provides for a twenty-percent 
carried interest—ensures that the private equity firm (sponsor) itself is highly 
motivated to increase portfolio companies’ value.35  In turn, the carried interest 
is typically shared among a relatively small number of individuals.36  The 
                                                 
33 See Ulf Axelson, Tim Jenkinson, Per Strömberg, & Michael S. Weisbach, Borrow Cheap, 
Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts, 68 J. FIN. 2223, 2239 (2013). 
34 But see Gretchen Morgenson, When Private Equity Firms Give Retirees the Short End, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/business/retirement/when-private-equity-firms-give-
retirees-the-short-end.html?_r=0 (discussing examples of private equity firms receiving 
discounts from law firms on legal work pertaining to the firm itself, while their fund investors 
are charged premium rates by the same firms for transactional work).  Such volume discounts 
for the private equity firm, rather than the fund, could incentivize private equity firms to select 
higher-quality law firms for the fund work than would be optimal.  In October 2015, 
Blackstone, a major private equity sponsor, reached a settlement with the SEC for its alleged 
failure to disclose such a differential fee structure negotiated with its law firm.   
35 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 121, 124 (2009). 
36 See id. at 123 (noting that even the largest private equity firms are “still small relative to 
the firms in which they invest.”); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. 
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private equity ownership and compensation structure thus maintains relatively 
high-powered incentives for the individuals responsible for affecting firm 
value, in contrast to the diffuse management incentive problems that plague 
large public companies. 
Third, private equity firms are sophisticated, high-volume players for this 
type of loan transaction.  If elite law firms do indeed increase the value of their 
loan transactions, then private equity firms are particularly well poised to 
recognize and to capitalize on this advantage.  
In sum, we have good reasons to believe that private equity firms perform 
relatively well at maximizing value through their selection of counsel, though 
the data presented herein cannot resolve the question.  Private equity firms’ 
preference for higher-ranked law firms therefore suggests that such firms 
provide them, on average, with a better economic deal—even taking into 
account higher legal fees. Equivalently, private equity firms are unlikely to be 
simply overpaying for legal services.  Their preference for higher-ranked firms 
thus provides a benchmark for evaluating the selection of counsel by public 
companies, the task to which we now turn. 
 
B.  Is The Private Equity Calculus Generalizable? 
 
If we accept the premise that private equity firms select the quality of their 
counsel relatively efficiently, we are left with two alternative hypotheses for the 
finding that public companies opt for lower-ranked financing counsel:  
 
1) High-quality law firms benefit private-equity-owned companies 
more than they do public companies, all else being equal; or  
 
2) High-quality law firms benefit private equity-owned companies 
and public companies equally, but public companies choose 
lower-ranked firms for non-value-maximizing reasons. 
 
This section discusses the first hypothesis, while the second is addressed in 
Part C below.  There are two principal reasons why elite counsel might, on 
average, benefit private equity firms more than another types of corporate 
clients.  First, private equity firms’ raison d’être is to acquire portfolio companies 
and to dispose of them at a premium.  They are therefore involved in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) activity far more frequently than are public 
companies, on average.  Because private equity M&A is leveraged, each of 
these acquisition transactions is typically accompanied by a simultaneous debt 
financing transaction.  Thus, to the extent that private equity firms select elite 
counsel for their financing transactions, this may simply be a reflection of their 
                                                                                                                            
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 70. 
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antecedent need for elite M&A counsel.37  Indeed, large M&A transactions 
often involve complex regulatory concerns (such as antitrust and securities 
regulation), litigation risk (shareholder lawsuits and appraisal proceedings), and 
tactical maneuvering (such as takeover defenses and auction processes), for 
which an experienced law firm proves invaluable.38  
The regression model seeks to minimize the potentially distorting influence 
of M&A by controlling for whether a loan was issued in connection with an 
acquisition.  (Interestingly, the latter had no statistically significant effect on 
the borrower’s likelihood of choosing top-ranked counsel in our results.)  This 
does not fully address the problem, however.  Imagine, for example, that a 
private equity firm hires an elite firm for its acquisition of a particular target 
company and the accompanying financing.  If the target—now a portfolio 
company—later opts to refinance its debt, the new debt is no longer coded as 
acquisition-related.  Nonetheless, the initial choice of elite counsel for the 
acquisition likely increases the probability that elite counsel will be used for the 
refinancing: clearly there are economies of scale in using the same law firm for 
a given company’s subsequent financings.  Thus, even controlling for 
acquisition-related loans, private equity-owned companies may be more likely 
to select elite counsel for their financings than companies starting from a clean 
slate. 
A second potential explanation for why elite counsel might benefit private 
equity-sponsored companies and public companies differentially might be that, 
contrary to a key assumption of the regression model, loans to the two groups 
effectively amount to two different legal products.  Thus, for example, the 
added complexity of private-equity-related financings (as compared to “plain 
vanilla” public-company loans) may be sufficiently large that elite counsel 
simply adds more value, all else being equal.  The financing contingencies 
associated with leveraged acquisitions create additional risks for creditors and 
complicate both the structuring and the documentation.  In order to minimize 
heterogeneity in the sample from legal complexity, the regression model 
controls for whether a loan is acquisition-related, secured, or (in unreported 
regressions) investment-grade.  While such controls are designed to achieve 
better matching in the sample, they may nonetheless be imperfect or 
insufficient correctives.39 
 
                                                 
37 See Davidoff, supra note 25. 
38 See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and Merger and Acquisition 
Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 192 (2013) (finding an association between the use of top-tier 
law firms in M&A transactions and better client outcomes). 
39 Notwithstanding, simply pointing to the fact that private-equity-sponsored loans tend 
to involve more complex terms does not on its own entail that such loans should be treated as 
a different class of legal work from public-company loans: the effect may be at least partly 
endogenous, reflecting the influence of more elite counsel for private equity deals. 
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C.  The Public Company Perspective 
 
This section assumes that elite counsel does on average add more value to 
all clients’ loan transactions than lower-ranked counsel, and identifies possible 
explanations for why public companies are nonetheless less likely than private 
equity firms to employ elite counsel.40  If private equity firms are correct, hiring 
a lower-ranked firm is inefficient—tantamount to passing up free money. 
How, then, do we account for the choice made by public companies?   
 
1. General Counsel Decision-Making. 
 
One approach is to hypothesize a variety of inefficiencies in the demand 
for legal services by public companies.  First, public companies may select their 
outside counsel sub-optimally due to a pure information problem, preventing 
them from accurately gauging law firms’ quality or the relationship between 
law firm quality and transaction value.  Certainly some degree of information 
asymmetry exists between companies and law firms as the former contract for 
legal services.41  A prime example of credence goods,42 legal services are 
notoriously difficult to value.  Specifically, if the general counsels of public 
companies are unsophisticated or inexperienced at weighing the costs and 
benefits of outside counsel services, they may well select their counsel poorly.  
Perhaps general counsels, often far removed from their days in private 
practice, underestimate the value of top-ranked firms’ services, and law firms 
are unable to convey these benefits convincingly.  Similarly, general counsels 
                                                 
40 The finding that public companies are incentivized to pick lower-quality firms than is 
optimal stands in contrast to the oft-told story that companies hire prestigious firms as cover 
for their own decisions or actions.  See, e.g., Brian Uzzi et al., Your Client Relationships and 
Reputation: Weighing the Worth of Social Ties: Embeddedness and the Price of Legal Services in the Large 
Law Firm Market, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW CHALLENGES, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 91, 115 (Laura Empson ed., 2007) (concluding that “in-house counsel…use 
[law-firm] status to justify a hiring decision to their superiors or to cover themselves in case 
something goes wrong with the deal even though a lower cost firm of equal quality is 
available.”).  The difference may turn on the degree of risk and visibility involved: for low-risk 
transactions such as a routine loan financing—even a very large one—general counsels may 
spend too little on their law firms, consistent with this Article’s findings.  For high-risk, high-
visibility transactions, by contrast, general counsels may be personally incentivized to have the 
company overspend on law-firm quality.  See also Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and 
the Roles of General Counsel, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 463 (2012) (discussing the interrelationship 
between the reputations of the general counsel and the corporation it serves). 
41 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2001) (“[P]rincipals (clients) have little information about what their 
agents are doing”); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE 
OF LEGAL SERVICES 148—49 (2008) (noting how the incentives of law firms and their clients 
may diverge). 
42 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 
J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 (1973) (defining credence goods).  
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may be overly confident in their in-house staff’s abilities and therefore spend 
too little on outside counsel.   
As far as it goes, this argument seems unsatisfactory.  The general counsels 
of the largest public companies are often taken directly from elite law firms, 
and thus could hardly be described as unsophisticated about the work 
performed by such firms.  Further, it is unclear why a lack of sophistication 
would result in a systematic preference for lower-ranked counsel.  Indeed, 
plausible arguments exist for the opposite result, with unsophisticated general 
counsels biased in favor of higher-ranked counsel: precisely because they lack 
information, unsophisticated general counsels might be most likely to rely on 
rankings as the best proxy for quality and to seek the highest-ranked counsel.  
A more promising set of explanations derives from a second type of 
inefficiency in the demand for legal services, namely the agency costs 
associated with public-company general counsels.  Assume here that a general 
counsel is well aware that spending more on a law firm should be expected to 
result in a better economic deal for the company, even net of legal fees.  
Nonetheless, she proceeds to staff the transaction either with a less expensive 
law firm or with the company’s in-house lawyers.  While this choice is 
suboptimal from the perspective of the company’s shareholders, it may 
nonetheless advance the general counsel’s private interests.  Certainly the 
general counsel has at least some incentive to maximize the corporation’s 
value, whether for self-interested reasons (such as increasing the value of her 
stock options and ensuring her continued employment) or simply acting as a 
faithful agent of the company.  Yet the general counsel’s private incentives also 
include concerns such as pleasing management and maximizing the visibility 
and prestige of the in-house counsel team within the company.43   
Thus, general counsels may tend to favor in-house counsel over outside 
counsel or to hire cheaper outside counsel for a transaction for several reasons.  
First, once in-house staff has been hired, the general counsel has strong 
incentives to see it utilized to capacity and even expanded: steering 
transactional work to in-house lawyers reduces the unpleasant prospect of staff 
layoffs and increases their visibility and influence with the rest of the 
management team.44 As the company’s chief legal officer and the person 
responsible for hiring and overseeing in-house counsel, the general counsel 
may well view his key task—second only to avoiding catastrophic legal risk for 
the company—as justifying, on a daily basis, the existence of the in-house legal 
team.   
Second, as a mechanism to limit discretionary spending, within many 
companies the board of directors or upper-level management must approve—
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, 
and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495 (2012) 
44 See David Wilkins, Teams of Rivals: Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney/Client Relationship, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 2009 669 (2010). 
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formally or informally—the general counsel’s decision to hire outside counsel.  
Similarly, many general counsels are restricted to selecting from among a pre-
approved, short list of law firms for the company’s legal work.45  Absent 
express permission from the board, this prevents a general counsel from 
engaging a different firm for a transaction on a one-off basis, even if—in his 
view—it would be the best firm for the job.  Such approval requirements 
should lead general counsels to spend less on outside counsel than is optimal: 
they may be reluctant to expend their political capital within the company on a 
decision that only provides them with highly attenuated private benefits.   
In simple cost-benefit terms, the costs to the company of hiring elite 
counsel are immediate, tangible, and incurred with certainty, while the benefits 
of doing so are typically delayed, intangible, uncertain, and impossible to 
measure precisely even after the fact.46  Persuading her company to engage 
more expensive counsel may thus prove difficult for a general counsel, even if 
she truly believes that the benefits outweigh the costs.  Indeed, whereas the in-
house legal department effectively amounts to a fixed (and sunk) cost, legal 
fees for outside counsel represent an additional, highly visible cash outlay.47  At 
the same time, the board and senior management are poorly positioned to 
appreciate the benefits of better counsel.  Such benefits cannot be measured in 
any particular instance: the output of a law firm’s efforts is largely intangible—
it is difficult to ascribe a cash value to having a particular covenant in a loan 
agreement, for example—and even were that not the case, measuring the 
added economic benefit of a higher quality law firm requires a calculation 
based on an unknowable counterfactual scenario, namely what transaction 
value a lower-quality firm would have produced on behalf of the client.  
Finally, even if we expect that, on average, paying more for an elite law firm 
will result in a greater transaction value ex post, there is no assurance ex ante that 
this will be the case.  (Stated differently, while the expected transaction value 
should be higher with a higher-ranked law firm, the actual, realized value need 
not be: there is some risk involved.)  A risk-averse general counsel might thus 
prefer less expensive counsel, in order to avoid shouldering the blame vis-à-vis 
the rest of the management team if the costs ultimately end up outweighing 
the benefits.48  All told, the general counsel’s private cost-benefit calculus may, 
at the margins, lead her to take the path of least resistance (and risk) and opt 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., LARRY SMITH, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: HOW BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 173 
(2001). 
46 See Coates, supra note 36, at 1311-13 (summarizing the difficulties in assessing the costs 
and benefits of legal advice in the context of initial public offerings). 
47 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to 
Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014) (noting that “institutional clients have 
begun to wonder whether they should use less prestigious, lower-cost firms…”). 
48 As discussed, in other settings (such as high-stakes litigation or a hostile acquisition), 
general counsel risk aversion might tilt in favor of engaging more expensive counsel.  See Uzzi 
et al., supra note 35 at 115. 
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for less expensive counsel. 
All this to say that, due to agency and influence costs, the general counsels 
of large public companies arguably internalize the costs and benefits of their 
companies’ choice of transactional counsel less than do private equity firms, 
and that, consistent with our empirical results, this can prompt them to 
underspend on outside counsel.49  Public-company general counsels act within 
large, bureaucratic organizations, and have conflicting allegiances to 
shareholders, management, and their in-house staff.  Large corporations are by 
all accounts intensely political environments, and we should not be surprised 
that, like all other corporate management positions, the general counsel role 
engenders agency and influence costs.50  In this particular case, it may lead 
general counsels to make suboptimal decisions in selecting counsel for major 
transactions.   
 
2. Relationship Lawyering 2.0? 
 
An alternative, and less troubling, explanation for the discrepancy between 
the law firms chosen by private equity-owned companies and public 
companies deserves mention.  “Relationship lawyering” refers to corporate 
clients’ practice of directing virtually all of their legal work to a single law firm 
(or a very small number of law firms), over a long period of time.  
Commentators have noted (and often decried) the contemporary decline of 
relationship lawyering for corporate clients,51 with a client’s long-term 
relationship with a single firm being replaced by one-off, impersonal 
engagements with numerous firms.52  Yet decline does not equate to 
                                                 
49 While large private equity firms are likely to have general counsels themselves, their in-
house staff (if any) is negligible in size compared to that of large public companies, as the 
private equity compensation scheme provides incentives to keep staffing to a barebones 
minimum.  Further, they face significantly higher-powered incentives than their counterparts 
at public companies, thus benefitting more from any given increase in firm value.  They are 
thus significantly less likely to suffer from the agency and influence costs of public-company 
in-house legal departments.   
50 The seminal treatment of intra-firm agency costs and influence costs is from 
Williamson (1991) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990), respectively.  See Paul Milgrom & John 
Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 58 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) 
(defining “influence costs” as the costs of political activity within firms); Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features, in THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM (1985). 
See also Geoffrey Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in 
Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 807 (2010). 
51 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990); Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”: How 
Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal 
Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002).  
52 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Infrastructure and the New Economy, 8 I/S: J.L. & 
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disappearance.  Under certain conditions, using a relationship firm (or, as may 
be more common today, two or three relationship firms) for a corporate 
transaction may be the optimal choice for a company, even if the relationship 
firm is relatively less experienced with that type of transaction.53  Even 
assuming that an elite firm with significant transactional experience might, for 
example, obtain better deal terms for the company, the cost savings from using 
its relationship firm could conceivably outweigh this.  This would be due not 
simply to the relationship firm’s lower fees, but more importantly to its 
familiarity with the company’s unique regulatory issues and its ready access to 
information within the company.  Indeed, the traditional justification for 
relationship lawyering is the greater (and less costly) information flow between 
client and law firm, relative to one-off engagements, resulting in lower 
transaction costs.54     
Thus, while we can posit that a large public company is likely to do better 
on a financing transaction using an elite firm rather than a lower-ranked firm 
on a one-off basis, the same is not necessarily true if the comparison is between 
using an elite firm on a one-off basis and using a lower-ranked relationship 
firm.  Ironically, in fact, private equity firms themselves can be considered 
champions of the relationship-firm model, in a sense.  Most of the largest 
private equity firms direct the bulk of their business to one or two law firms.55 
However, much of this has to do with such firms’ long-standing experience 
with, and market knowledge of, M&A and financing transactions.  Simply put, 
the relationship firms of the largest private equity sponsors are the most elite 
law firms,56 making it difficult to parse the specific sources of value that they 
provide.  Finally, there is another key distinction to be drawn between 
relationship lawyering involving private equity firms and public operating 
companies.  While public companies’ relationship law firms are familiar with 
the operating companies themselves, in the private equity context the 
                                                                                                                            
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 33 (2012) (finding that companies have begun spreading legal work 
across a greater number of law firms); David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going 
Global? A Preliminary Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 251, 258 (2012) (noting general counsels’ ability to make several law firms compete for 
business). 
53 See John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers: Evidence of the Evolving 
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999 (2011) (finding that, while 
large corporations today use several law firms, their relationships with such firms tend to 
persist over time); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2067, 2070 (2010) (describing a new stage 
in the evolution of law firm/client relations, moving from impersonal, one-off spot-
contracting to something akin to strategic partnerships). 
54 See Gilson, supra note 46. 
55 See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 535–37 
(2009) (describing the persistent relationships between large private equity firms and a small 
set of elite law firms). 
56 See id. 
 AGENCY COSTS IN LAW FIRM SELECTION 21 
relationship law firms are familiar with the private equity firm, but not 
necessarily with the portfolio companies that they acquire.57  The informational 
efficiencies from the law firm/client relationship should therefore differ in 
kind, further complicating the comparison. 
In short, if the agency-cost account is correct, public companies are likely 
under-spending on legal counsel for their major corporate transactions, and 
thus forgoing better economic outcomes.  If instead the relationship-lawyering 
account is the correct one, then the discrepancy in law firm usage between 
private equity firms and public companies may be relatively benign or even 
efficient.  Private equity firms get the benefit of better deal terms by hiring 
top-tier, repeat-player law firms, while public companies may, in some cases, 
maximize their transaction surplus by sticking with their lower-ranked 
relationship law firm(s), which reduces information costs.58 
The answer depends on how skilled public companies are at weighing the 
costs and benefits of never defecting from their relationship firms, and this 
Article’s empirical results alone do not provide the answer.  For the reasons 
discussed above, however, we might suspect that public companies tend to 
place too much emphasis on transaction costs, due to their greater salience, 
while discounting the true benefits of higher-quality law firms.  We should be 
particularly skeptical of companies’ attempts to lower out-of-pocket costs for 
the very largest transactions, for which transaction costs are, on a relative basis, 
less significant.59  Thus, there is reason to doubt whether companies that 
employ their lower-ranked relationship firms for major transactions are—
absent truly significant, company-specific risks—correctly balancing the 
associated costs and benefits.   
 
 
III.  CASE STUDY: A TALE OF FOUR FINANCINGS 
 
Specific examples starkly illustrate the divergence in legal representation 
between private-equity-sponsored and (non-sponsored) public companies 
identified in the regression results from Part I.  Table 4 below provides a (non-
                                                 
57 For many reasons, it is usually infeasible for private equity firms to engage law firms 
that are already very familiar with their portfolio companies.  For example, if a private equity 
firm is seeking to make an acquisition, then the target corporation’s long-standing counsel 
would either be representing the seller or would be conflicted in the transaction, and the seller 
would have little incentive to waive the conflict.   
58 Of course, we are left with the question of why public companies appear to have lower-
ranked relationship law firms than do private equity sponsors.  The most plausible answer is 
that large, public operating companies are more likely than private equity firms to generate 
routine legal work (such as negotiating commercial contract forms or litigating employment 
disputes) for which the cost of elite-quality counsel is not justified. 
59 See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 507 (noting that for large transactions, “legal fees are 
relatively small compared to overall transaction costs and benefits.”). 
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exhaustive) list of multi-billion-dollar syndicated loans for which major public 
corporations chose to be represented by law firms falling outside the elite 
circle of U.S. borrower-side finance counsel. 
 
Table 4.  Public Company Legal Representation for Syndicated Loans. 
 
Borrower Loan Size Year Borrower Law Firm 
Reynolds American Inc.  $9 billion 2014 Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP 
Lockheed Martin Corporation  $7 billion 2015 Hogan Lovells US LLP 
Duke Energy Corporation  $6 billion 2011 Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. 
McKesson Corporation  $5.5 billion 2013 Morrison & Forester LLP 
Halliburton Company  $4.5 billion 2015 Baker Botts L.L.P. 
Constellation Brands, Inc.  $4.4 billion 2013 Nixon Peabody LLP 
Fidelity National Information Services $4 billion 2013 Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP 
MetLife, Inc. $4 billion 2014 Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP 
National Oilwell Varco, Inc.  $3.5 billion 2012 Haynes and Boone, LLP 
Philip Morris International Inc.  $3.5 billion 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 
Apache Corporation  $3.5 billion 2015 Porter & Hedges, LLP 
Noble Energy, Inc.  $3 billion 2011 Thompson & Knight L.L.P. 
Hologic, Inc.  $2.8 billion 2012 Brown Rudnick LLP 
ARRIS Group, Inc.  $2.8 billion 2015 Troutman Sanders LLP 
Universal Health Services, Inc.  $2.6 billion 2014 Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. 
Air Lease Corporation  $2.1 billion 2014 Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP 
American Airlines, Inc.  $2.1 billion 2013 Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw & Pittman LLP 
Jabil Circuit, Inc.  $2 billion 2015 Holland & Knight LLP 
CenturyLink, Inc.  $2 billion 2012 Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrère & Denègre LLP 
QVC, Inc.  $2 billion 2013 Sherman & Howard L.L.C. 
United Air Lines, Inc.  $1.9 billion 2013 Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP 
PPG Industries, Inc.  $1.8 billion 2015 K&L Gates LLP 
Lowe’s Companies, Inc.  $1.75 billion 2014 Moore & Van Allen PLLC 
Iron Mountain Incorporated  $1.75 billion 2015 Sullivan & Worcester LLP 
Supervalu Inc.  $1.7 billion 2012 Dorsey & Whitney LLP 
Steel Dynamics, Inc.  $1.5 billion 2014 Barrett & McNagny, LLP 
Patterson Companies, Inc.  $1.5 billion 2015 Briggs and Morgan, P.A. 
PTC Inc.  $1.5 billion 2014 Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP 
Intuit Inc.  $1.5 billion 2016 Fenwick & West LLP 
Northrop Grumman Corporation  $1.5 billion 2011 Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
 
This Part III examines the various theories of how public companies select 
counsel in practice, using a brief case study.  Specifically, it explores the 
decision by four major U.S. public companies to select un-ranked borrower’s 
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counsel for the loan transactions listed in Table 4 above.  Each involved a loan 
facility exceeding a billion dollars, such that the economic impact of the actual 
loan terms was very high, while the cost of transaction counsel would have 
been relatively insignificant.  This has two implications.  First, with loans of 
that size, any incremental improvement in transaction value that counsel could 
provide would very likely outweigh the additional cost of elite firms.60  In other 
words, better counsel should, in expectation, pay for itself.  Second, we can 
safely assume that these companies had the ability to pay for any counsel of 
their choosing.61  Therefore, in examining these companies’ decision to opt for 
relatively lower-ranked counsel, the appropriate inquiry is limited to whether 
the expected economic loss in transaction value was offset by some other 
plausible benefit from their choice of counsel. 
 
 
A.  Berkshire Hathaway 
 
With a market capitalization of nearly $350 billion and an astonishing 
record of beating the U.S. stock market’s performance over a fifty-year period, 
Berkshire Hathaway has long been a company of superlatives.  As the third 
largest public company in the United States, however, Berkshire’s spending on 
professional services is far from lavish.  For its $8 billion borrowing in 
November 2009—used to finance Berkshire’s acquisition of Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Corporation—the conglomerate selected as its counsel 
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP,62 a comparatively small though highly-regarded 
law firm.63  The connection between Berkshire and Munger Tolles is no 
accident: Charlie Munger, the legendary Berkshire director with a near forty-
year tenure, was one of the founders of Munger Tolles in 1962.64   
Nonetheless, the decision to use Munger Tolles for such a large financing 
is far from self-evident, even putting aside the law firm’s moderate size.  
Munger Tolles is primarily known for its elite litigation practice, rather than for 
                                                 
60 See id. (noting that transaction costs are less important for larger transactions). 
61 A common problem with analyses of consumers’ revealed preferences is the difficulty 
of disentangling ability and willingness to pay for a particular good.  In the case studies herein, 
there were no meaningful constraints on ability to pay for counsel, given the size of the 
corporations at issue. 
62 See $8,000,000,000 Credit Agreement Among Berkshire Hathaway Inc., The Lenders 
Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Nov. 18, 2009), available at  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934612/000119312509238536/dex3.htm.  
63 The firm has approximately 200 attorneys across all of its offices. 
64 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement (May 2, 2015) (hereinafter “Berkshire 
Proxy Statement”), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312515091378/d854690ddef14a.
htm.  Ronald Olson, also a Berkshire director (since 1997), is another founder of Munger 
Tolles and remains a partner of the firm to this day.  Id. 
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transactional work.65  More to the point, while Munger Tolles can credibly 
claim to offer highly sophisticated, bespoke service to its clients, it cannot 
claim to have the same grasp of the “market” terms of large loan transactions 
as the elite, (generally) New York-based, law firms that dominate the 
syndicated-loan market—nor the same experience drafting and negotiating 
them.  Compared to such firms, Munger Tolles has a decidedly low-volume, 
low-market-share loan practice.  Yet for an $8 billion deal, the additional 
transaction costs (if any) involved in hiring a high-market-share firm over 
Munger Tolles would be truly negligible.   
How, then, can we account for Berkshire’s choice of firm in this instance?  
One possibility is that it reflected one or more conflicts of interest.  Two of 
the law firm’s founders, Charlie Munger and Ronald Olson, are currently 
directors of Berkshire Hathaway, with tenures of nearly forty and twenty years, 
respectively.66  While Charlie Munger is no longer associated with the law firm, 
Ronald Olson is still a practicing partner.  Berkshire’s decision to stick with 
Munger Tolles for its transactional work might thus be an example of modest 
cronyism, though there is no evidence that this is indeed the case.     
A far more promising explanation is to point to the unusual culture of 
Berkshire Hathaway, which puts a significant premium on handling matters 
internally and with barebones staffing.  Its longstanding CEO, Warren Buffett, 
is strikingly and vocally averse to intermediation.67  Though his disdain is 
primarily directed at investment banks,68 it arguably extends to law firms on 
the same principle, driving him to rely minimally on counsel by opting for a 
relatively small firm.  The question, of course, is whether this strategy is 
ultimately beneficial to the company.  If Berkshire’s decision to eschew 
investment banks, for example, actually leads its potential acquisition targets to 
do the same, the company might reap significant benefits by acquiring 
companies at a significantly lower share premium than it otherwise would.69  It 
seems unlikely that opting for less-experienced financing counsel could reap 
similar benefits for the company, however.  Moreover, the benefit of hiring 
experienced counsel would seem particularly important in this case, given that 
                                                 
65 See http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12059/717/editorial/5/1#org_3535. 
66 See Berkshire Proxy Statement, supra note 60. 
67 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire versus KKR: Intermediary Influence and Competition, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 101 (2015). 
68 See Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2014 Letter to Shareholders, available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf. 
69 See Neil Irwin, Why Warren Buffett Is Worth $72 Billion and You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (March 
2, 2105), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/upshot/why-warren-buffett-is-
worth-72-billion-and-youre-not-two-theories-on-berkshire-hathaway.html.  The benefit to 
Berkshire comes not from the transaction-cost savings of avoiding investment banks, but from 
the fact that, without an investment bank to represent it, the target company is likely to be sold 
for a lower price. 
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Berkshire almost never issues debt70 and therefore has little internal experience 
with the full range of contractual terms on which such financing can be 
obtained.   
While Berkshire may be correct to be suspicious of the incentives of 
intermediaries in general, adhering to that principle in every instance betrays a 
near-ideological aversion to transaction costs that may not be value-
maximizing for each individual transaction.  Perhaps, then, Berkshire’s choice 
of counsel is best viewed as part of its broad strategies of signaling to potential 
acquisition targets that it favors long-term business relationships and of leaving 
Warren Buffett’s minimalist mark on every aspect of the company’s culture—
strategies that, rightly or wrongly, have been wildly attractive to investors. 
 
 
B.  Philip Morris International and Northrop Grumman 
 
As behemoths of the tobacco and defense industries, respectively, Philip 
Morris International71 and Northrop Grumman72 have both recently engaged 
financing counsel outside the top ranks for multi-billion-dollar loans.  For its 
$3.5 billion revolving credit facility in 2015, Philip Morris chose Hunton & 
Williams LLP, its primary and longstanding U.S. relationship firm.  In contrast, 
Northrop Grumman does not appear to have relied on a relationship firm for 
its $1.5 billion loan in 2011: based on searches of the public record, the 
interactions between the company and its selected counsel, Sheppard, Mullin, 
Richter & Hampton LLP, are limited and of relatively recent origin.  In both 
cases, geographic proximity appears to have played a role: Philip Morris’s U.S. 
operations and Hunton & Williams are both products of Richmond, Virginia,73 
while Sheppard Mullin74 and Northrop Grumman75 were both founded in the 
Los Angeles area, where Northrop Grumman was also headquartered until 
                                                 
70 See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 105. 
71 See Credit Agreement Relating to a US$3,500,000,000 Revolving Credit Facility Among 
Philip Morris International Inc., The Initial Lenders Named Therein, Citibank 
International Limited, and Citibank, N.A. (Oct. 1, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1413329/000119312515337340/d49908dex101.h
tm.  
72 See Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman 
Corporation, The Lenders Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 8, 2011) 
(hereinafter “Northrop Grumman Credit Agreement”), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312511247019/d230126dex101.htm.  
73 See http://www.vault.com/company-profiles/law/hunton-williams-llp/company-
overview.aspx. 
74 See http://www.vault.com/company-profiles/law/sheppard-mullin-richter-hampton-
llp/company-overview.aspx. 
75 See Northrop Grumman Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2015) at 1, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000113342115000008/noc-
12312014x10k.htm.  
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recently.     
Both Northrop Grumman and Philip Morris operate in industries with 
significant regulatory burdens and public or private enforcement risk.  Further, 
as a defense firm, much of Northrop Grumman’s work product and contracts 
cannot be publicly disclosed,76 and approximately 85 percent of its sales are to 
a single customer—the U.S. government—further complicating the task of 
securing financing.77  Companies operating in a costly and highly specialized 
regulatory environment are surely potential candidates for either (1) developing 
close, long-term relationships with a small number of law firms or (2) steering 
work to a large in-house staff.  Here, Philip Morris opted for the first strategy, 
while Northrop Grumman appears to have chosen the second.78     
When is a client justified in using a relationship firm over superior finance 
counsel?  The advantage of relationship firms is their intimate knowledge of 
their clients, including in particular their unique regulatory and litigation risks.  
Yet even accepting that Philip Morris has benefitted from cultivating a 
relationship firm in the first place, it is unclear why this would preclude it from 
using elite financing counsel in a one-off transaction—or, in fact, from using 
both its relationship firm and elite financing counsel—particularly for a loan of 
this size.   
Northrop Grumman’s decision to rely on the combination of in-house 
counsel and a firm with relatively little experience in syndicated lending is also 
surprising.79  Because out-of-pocket transaction costs are small in proportion 
to loans of this size, Northrop Grumman could have engaged elite finance 
counsel to complement its in-house regulatory expertise.  In fact, the company 
subsequently did just that: it used top-ranked Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP 
for each of its three syndicated loan financings in 2012, 2013, and 2015.80 
                                                 
76 See id. at 5 (referring to the company’s “restricted” programs). 
77 Id. at 7. 
78 The fact that one of the borrower’s legal opinions was provided by an officer of 
Northrop Grumman suggests that its in-house lawyers were involved in the financing.  See 
Northrop Grumman Credit Agreement, supra note 68. 
79 The Sheppard Mullin website touts the firm’s experience with government contracting 
and corporate transactions for the aerospace and defense industry.  See 
http://www.sheppardmullin.com/aerospace-and-defense (last visited December 2, 2015) 
(“Our attorneys have 100+ years combined experience serving aerospace and defense industry 
clients…We know the industry and the environment in which participants compete.”). 
80 See 364-Day Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The Lenders 
Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Sept. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000113342112000038/exhibit101.htm; 
Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The Lenders Party Thereto, and 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312513353825/d591544dex101.h
tm; Amended and Restated Credit Agreement Among Northrop Grumman Corporation, The 
Lenders Party Thereto, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Jul. 8, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1133421/000119312515249197/d95748dex101.h
tm. 
 AGENCY COSTS IN LAW FIRM SELECTION 27 
Because the defense and tobacco industries are considered unsavory by 
some, an alternative explanation would be that the most elite law firms were 
simply less willing to provide legal services to these two companies.  The 
motive for law firms to avoid such clients involves some combination of 
reputational concerns, the express or implied wishes of existing clients engaged 
in socially responsible investing (such as pension funds, foundations, and 
university endowments), and the firms’ recruiting appeal to graduates of the 
most elite law schools.  There does not appear to be any evidence that these 
companies are indeed “untouchables” from law firms’ perspective, however.  
In other contexts such as litigation, it is routinely assumed that the lure of 
immediate profits generally outweighs law firms’ qualms about their clients’ 
reputations.  In both cases, then, we are simply left to wonder whether 
behavioral factors (such as inertia or personal preferences) or agency costs 
played any role in the selection of counsel.  
 
 
C.  Lowe’s 
 
For its $1.75 billion credit facility, which closed in August 2014, Lowe’s 
Companies relied on Moore & Van Allen PLLC,81 a Charlotte-based law firm 
with just over 300 attorneys across its various offices.  Lowe’s itself is 
headquartered just outside of Charlotte, in Moorseville, North Carolina.  
Lowe’s Companies’ choice of finance counsel is striking, and not simply as 
another apparent example of relationship lawyering.  (Moore & Van Allen has 
represented Lowe’s in prior financings.)  Particularly intriguing is the fact that 
Moore & Van Allen known for representing lenders and underwriters, rather 
than borrowers.  (In the year in which the Lowe’s credit facility closed, by 
syndicated-loan volume Moore & Van Allen was ranked 17th among all U.S. 
law firms for lender-side representation and 86th for borrower-side 
representation.)  With major lender clients such as Bank of America, Moore & 
Van Allen has a well-established reputation for elite-quality lending work. 
Among law firms, there is a divide between those that tend to represent 
major borrowers (such as private equity firms and Fortune 500 operating 
companies) and those that tend to represent the major banks that arrange or 
underwrite their loans.82  Of course, experience with lender-side work is 
undoubtedly useful for borrower-side work as well.  Rather, the concern from 
                                                 
81 See Credit Agreement Among Lowe’s Companies, Inc., Bank of America, N.A., and 
The Other Lenders Party Thereto (Aug. 29, 2014), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/60667/000006066714000146/exhibit101.htm. 
82 The same type of divide holds true to a lesser extent for mergers and acquisitions, with 
certain firms developing reputations for representing financial buyers such as private equity 
firms, and others specializing in representing major operating companies on the sell-side.  See 
Davidoff, supra note 25. 
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the client’s perspective with crossing the divide should be that, for reputational 
reasons, a lender-side firm might not be willing to bargain aggressively when 
representing a borrower, in order to protect its standard negotiating positions 
when it represents lenders.  Thus, in this instance, the company chose a law 
firm that had business interests potentially adverse to its own. 
To conclude this Part III, these four case studies highlight the wide range 
of motivations for companies to select their counsel.  For loans exceeding a 
billion dollars, the economic calculus would seem relatively straightforward: 
borrowing companies should engage elite financing counsel, because, given the 
transaction size, the expected benefit in transaction terms should outweigh the 
negligible difference in legal fees.  Yet in each of these four cases, a major 
public company chose financing counsel outside the top rankings to represent 
it, and in at least one case also relied on its in-house staff.  While we cannot 
draw definitive conclusions from case studies, these examples illustrate that, in 
practice, many factors falling outside a one-off, transaction-specific cost-
benefit analysis can affect major companies’ choice of counsel.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The global financial crisis prompted corporate America to take a hard look 
at the fees charged by its law firms.  The continuing clamor for lower legal fees 
has already prompted significant changes in the operations and work product 
of corporate law firms and in companies’ processes for hiring them.  But are 
we headed in the right direction?  Within this context, empirical studies of law 
firm selection are long overdue.  When faced with a range in quality, how do 
corporate clients select among law firms, and are such selections value-
maximizing?  This Article finds a substantial discrepancy between the choice 
of counsel of private equity firms and public companies for major financing 
transactions.  While this result alone does not identify what motivates law-firm 
selection, it narrows the set of plausible hypotheses considerably for future 
work.  In addition, it suggests a surprising tendency among large public 
companies to spend too little on outside counsel for transactional work.  While 
the recent focus on legal fees is both timely and advisable, it should not be 
understood to justify hiring lower-quality counsel as a rule.   
 
 
 
Appendix A: Regressions with Industry Controls 
 
 Top-Firm_1 Top-Firm_2 Top-Firm_3 
Sponsored 4.320 2.921 3.660
 (12.43)** (7.48)** (10.94)**
ln(Loan Amount) 1.572 1.553 1.773
 (10.50)** (8.63)** (12.77)**
Acquisition Purpose 1.003 1.026 0.964
 (0.03) (0.18) (0.31)
Secured Loan 1.650 1.398 1.617
 (4.15)** (2.42)* (3.95)**
Industry indicators: 
Aerospace and defense 0.520 0.751 0.937
 (0.73) (0.30) (0.08)
Agriculture 0.389 0.172 0.158
 (1.15) (1.61) (1.72)
Automobiles, airlines and transportation 0.813 0.649 1.091
 (0.77) (1.38) (0.33)
Banking and financial services 0.974 0.839 1.194
 (0.10) (0.54) (0.65)
Chemicals 1.126 1.214 1.060
 (0.39) (0.57) (0.19)
Computer and electronic equipment 0.689 0.390 0.647
 (1.27) (2.59)** (1.47)
Construction and materials 1.103 0.998 0.960
 (0.32) (0.01) (0.13)
Consumer goods 1.008 2.553 1.024
 (0.02) (2.23)* (0.07)
Food and beverage 0.509 0.708 0.406
 (1.95) (0.91) (2.52)*
Forestry and paper 0.343 0.263 0.484
 (2.21)* (2.18)* (1.62)
Insurance 0.840 0.903 1.330
 (0.43) (0.22) (0.75)
Manufacturing and machinery 0.697 0.614 0.617
 (1.20) (1.35) (1.58)
Media and entertainment 1.100 1.137 1.293
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.85)
Medical devices and healthcare 0.822 0.735 0.870
 (0.71) (0.97) (0.51)
Mining and metals 0.774 0.793 0.786
 (0.90) (0.70) (0.85)
Oil and gas 1.313 0.816 0.392
 (1.13) (0.72) (3.57)**
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 1.534 0.861 1.558
 (1.20) (0.33) (1.23)
Real estate 0.468 0.462 0.433
 (2.93)** (2.68)** (3.21)**
Retailers 0.740 0.809 0.736
 (1.19) (0.73) (1.21)
Services 0.655 0.531 0.655
 (1.80) (2.33)* (1.81)
Telecommunications 1.038 0.809 1.022
 (0.11) (0.50) (0.06)
Textiles and apparel 1.717 0.631 1.666
 (1.45) (0.98) (1.37)
Travel and leisure 1.010 0.878 0.562
 (0.03) (0.28) (1.45)
 
N 2,979 1,970 2,979
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
